A Study of Port LSSC Coordination Considering Blockchain Factors Under Contract Theory

Abstract

For a port logistics service supply chain (LSSC) composed of a port enterprise and a carrier enterprise, Stackelberg game theory is used to study the blockchain factors and construct coordination decisions for port LSSC under revenue sharing contracts and quantity flexibility contracts, in order to solve the problem of difficult coordination between port enterprises and carrier enterprises in decentralized decision-making due to double marginal effects and imperfect trust mechanisms. Research has shown that the optimization coefficient of logistics costs by blockchain is positively correlated with wholesale prices of logistics capabilities, negatively correlated with the unit service cost of carrier enterprises, and negatively correlated with the profit of port LSSC and the optimization coefficient of blockchain logistics costs. Both revenue sharing contracts and quantity flexibility contracts can achieve port service supply chain coordination, with the coordination condition that the wholesale price of logistics capacity is equal to the unit service cost of carrier enterprises after blockchain optimization. The contract makes the profit distribution of port LSSC flexible, enhancing the coordination of port LSSC.